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Notes on Crises

IV. LEAKS AND SECRECY

A variety of motives lead to extraordinary measures to guard the secrecy of information and plans relating to crisis decisionmaking. These measures have their own impact upon the decisionmaking process. Moreover, they are not wholly successful in preventing leaks, nor are they expected to be. Thus, both the fact of leaks and the anticipation of leaks have a considerable influence on the evaluation of alternatives and on the tactics pursued by high-level decisionmakers before and during the crisis. Meanwhile, opponents in the crisis situation anticipate measures to insure secrecy, and significant parts of their behavior may be influenced by their guesses on the effectiveness of these measures; these guesses may, however, not be terribly good. There are indications that this is, in fact, a potent source of miscalculations, reflecting bad ^{feelings} feeling as to what sorts of secrets a U.S. President can keep, and how long and how well he can keep them. ^{TP} Finally, the process of secrecy, if it is effective, has two sorts of ~~substantive~~ substantive consequences: (a) to the extent that it actually ~~misleads~~ misleads third parties -- in other parts of government, in the public, in allies or opponents -- it may encourage these third parties to make commitments, predictions, threats, preparations, or ~~omissions~~ ^{to omit} omissions of such actions, and in general to behave otherwise than if they were better informed or even if they were aware that secrets were being withheld; some of these effects may be desired ^{by the} ~~(as when the party enforcing secrecy aims at a fait accompli)~~ ^{(as when he} but others may be, ~~at least~~ ^{by the} ~~with respect to certain of the parties,~~

undesired and even unanticipated. (This effect is of great importance; it will be discussed at length under notes I, II, III: Deception, Surprise, and Fait Accompli.)

(b) Whereas the intent of the secrecy is to control the [redacted] leakage of information "outwards," a little-noted and apparently ^{often} unanticipated effect may be to constrain the subsequent flow of information inward; *it* to reduce the normal feedback from third parties of their [redacted] attitudes toward, understanding of, and proposed responses to the information or plans whose secrecy is being guarded. (I suspect that this ill-understood effect of secrecy upon feedback is an important reason that the attempt to produce a surprise for an ally or opponent so frequently leads to responses or circumstances that come, in turn, as surprises for the initiator.) *e.g. limited "channel" (e.g. with State)*

In the first instance, much of the early information that fore-shadows the later crisis situation will often come through one or another intelligence channel. It is, then, subject to special security precautions automatically from the outset. Normally, an incoming item of intelligence may first receive fairly wide circulation among the "working level analysts" of the intelligence community in [redacted] an area determined either by the source of the information or by the subject [redacted] to which it is most obviously pertinent. As I understand the process, [redacted] if the item, after being collated with other apparently related information, is judged by the analysts of sufficient reliability and significance to warrant wider circulation, it may lead to ^{the "publication" of} an item in one ^{the} ^{highly classified} of the intelligence publications. If the general source of/information

is not or cannot be concealed, the publications in question are restricted fairly severely in circulation; nevertheless, their readership numbers in many thousands. If the source of the item is suppressed and ^{the item} ~~it~~ finds its way into intelligence digests of more general circulation, the potential readership is extremely large. The point is that under normal circumstances this circulation is determined essentially by the intelligence community itself, and except for the earliest stages may result in very wide knowledge of the information, without strict need-to-know restrictions, even though the item remains highly classified.

The basic working principle of the process of guarding secrets ^{overriding and for consideration of individual trustworthiness and "need to know"} is that the number of people exposed to the secret information should be as small as possible. Interpreted loosely, this seems like a truism; actually, a fair amount of sophistication is needed to appreciate just how strictly this ^{and can be} must be interpreted. It takes experience to learn how very hard it is to keep the secret, or certain kinds of secrets, despite the powerful sanctions a large organization can employ. Thus, when it is "really important" to preserve certain secrets, extraordinary measures come into play to limit the number of people with access, including the strict and perhaps even individual determination of "need-to-know", ^{special} formal clearances, and special channels and facilities for handling and distributing the information.

When this process is carried to an extreme, the set of people with access to the information or planning in question may be limited essentially to the principal advisers of the President, individuals close to Cabinet level. This leads directly to isolation from staffs and to decisionmaking by principals; see Note IX. When it is intelligence information that is withheld, an effect may be to preclude or postpone the process of

anticipatory planning which various planning staffs may initiate more or less on their own in response to the changing information available to them. When it is ~~the~~ planning that is restricted to the highest levels, the result may be planning by amateurs, or at best, by principals with many competing responsibilities, without detailed or current knowledge of operational problems, and without a recent past of preoccupation with the situation in ~~the~~ question.

How well can secrets be kept? That depends only in part upon the severity of the measures taken to guard them. It depends very much upon the existence and strength of motives for leaking, and these vary greatly with the item and the circumstances. Where there is no powerful motive to leak the information, secrets can in fact be held tight to a degree and for an interval that would be quite surprising, if not incredible, to those unfamiliar with the ^{security} processes involved. ¶ There may, on the other hand, be powerful incentives to release the information: for example, to generate pressure by other parts of government, by the public, or by allies to force certain actions by the President or to forestall others; to protect the ^{political} reputation or position of an individual, bureau or party; or to promote or defend the interests of a Service or governmental branch with respect to budget, role, or intragovernmental dispute. In such cases, the information, ^{if it leaks,} "leaks from the top": and it does leak. The view of high-level policymakers, based upon experience (though I am not aware how systematically that experience has been surveyed and analyzed), is that a secret which some high-level participants in the policy process have ~~the~~ a powerful incentive to leak simply cannot be kept. Limiting the number of people with

access can reduce, in borderline cases, the likelihood of including someone with such an incentive; ~~_____~~

~~_____~~

~~_____~~

~~_____~~ another effect, if the number with access is really small, is to make those individuals conscious that it may be relatively easy to investigate, identify, and punish the source of a leak. Nevertheless, in such circumstances, the extreme precautions that are taken are expected at most to postpone the revelation of the information (and perhaps to keep it ambiguous, by preventing or at least slowing widespread and authoritative confirmation of the news once revealed).

^{may be fairly}
It ~~is~~ the anticipation that certain secrets will be out before long that may give^s the process of forming policy its urgency. The deadline for decision will often be the estimated "leak date," and that deadline may be short enough to give the decision process the characteristics of crisis. (A related phenomenon is the short deadline imposed not by the expectation of a leak but by the obligation to tell certain parties -- Congress, allies, public -- certain information or plans within a "reasonable period." There may be a flurry of decisionmaking to work out a position or take some preparatory measures within the brief interval that the Administration can justify sitting on the information, much as police interrogators may work frantically to exploit the interval^o in which they are allowed to hold a suspect without specific charges.) [#] Substantively, certain policies may look acceptable only because it is believed, rightly or wrongly, that certain secrets can be kept, at least, "long enough" and effectively enough.

(This applies obviously to clandestine operations; the judgment can be wrong, as in the well-known case of the Bay of Pigs, and right or wrong it may lead to ~~calm~~^{calm} and pervasive restrictions upon the implementation of the policy (designed to preserve this secrecy.) On the other hand, certain actions which would be highly attractive if certain secrets could be kept, must be regretfully rejected because the President ~~must~~ conclude that the most extreme security precautions will be inadequate to prevent fatal leaks by highly placed opponents of the move.

The Cuban crisis, in particular, has led me to wonder whether this latter situation is officiated by the Soviets. Do Khrushchev and his advisers understand the limits of Presidential ability to keep a secret? I am told that the Russians in general respect our ability to keep secrets when we want to; Russian specialists in this subject are said to admire the efficiency of our security precautions. Is it possible, however, that they lack a good understanding of the discriminating features of U.S. ^{in the eyes of a US Administration,} secrets that cannot be kept? If so, they could overestimate the ~~President's~~ confidence that he could sit tight on certain information, and the Soviets might then be led to a distorted view of the considerations bearing on U.S. policy.

This ^{to me} area of misunderstanding would seem more likely if, in fact, it ~~reflects~~ reflects some asymmetry between the problems of the Soviet and U.S. administrators. The Soviets, whatever their internal disputes, would seem to lack an active and competitive press prying for secrets ~~more~~^{and} available to be leaked to. Moreover, while their multiple branches of government, their public and their allies are not totally

negligible, they are not comparably potent in the formation of policy.

Conceivably, it is simply hard for Khrushchev to appreciate the President's problem of keeping facts or plans private, or the effect of this Presidential concern upon U.S. policy. Moreover, the Soviets might generalize wrongly from past observation. [REDACTED] They were able to observe, for example, the efficiency with which the U-2 operation in 1956-1960 was kept from the general public. At the same time, however, Khrushchev was keeping secrets from his public that it might have been totally impossible for a U.S. president to conceal: namely, that his territory was being overflown regularly by a foreign power, that he was powerless militarily to prevent it, and that he was doing nothing effective, diplomatically or otherwise, to deter it. Did the Russians notice the difference between these two sorts of secrets? No one in the United States, knowledgeable about the U-2, had any incentive to reveal the fact: on the contrary. But if a U.S. president had been in Khrushchev's position, the incentives to compel forceful action and budgetary responses from him by [REDACTED] publishing the information would almost certainly have [REDACTED] overwhelmed any security precautions whatever.

These questions about Khrushchev's understanding of U.S. secrecy problems, and the references to the Cuban crisis, are somewhat cryptic: a fuller discussion must be classified.

The U-2 and the Cuban Crisis

collateral

1. Negative evidence on ~~agent~~ reports (spring 1962).
 2. Negative on ~~initial~~ missile reports, 5 Aug. (and on buildup?)
 3. Positive on SAMs, negative on MREMs, 29 Aug and 4 Sept.
 4. Alleged: McN, JFK relied heavily on photos, little on reports ("not evidence").
 5. 30 Aug ~~and~~; U-2 overflight of Sakhalin; Sept 8, U-2 shot down over China; & 31 Aug, 7 Sept evidence of SAMs, no evidence of MREMs---planned flight Sept 10 cancelled (why?): meeting of Sept 10.
- a) sensitivity to incidents; b) little prob of MREMs: 1) no evidence (assumption that they couldn't appear soon?), plus evidence of SAMs with which to discount agent reports; 3) expert disbelief (ONE, except for McC);
4) political disbelief (especially, wishfully, after we had announced?)
c) appearance of SAMs (especially in area where reports indicated possible site).

This led to desire

Komer, 27 March 64

On communication between Allies:

On Cyprus, our interests were not identical with British. But we had a good plan; which was held up for 10(?) days because we had failed to communicate with British, "educate" them (to a degree that was possible despite some difference in interest). Simply didn't get around to it? (British wouldn't accept, or had plan of their own?)

14 May

Hils: F-S exchange essential to interpretation of 26 May letter. The two were probably sent as a package ((K might guess: more likely to get answer to F offer earlier; and more likely to get good answer to letter if read in light of F offer.))

F was resident. (sure?)

Rusk told S to call F Saturday afternoon, wrote out message. S saw F at 1630, berated him in violent terms for Saturday morning message negating Friday night offer; said we never, never would consider Turkey deal in the slightest; said letter "means war." Said he spoke for himself, but hinted he reflected mood of nigherups.

(F claimed at start, and later, that K had not had F message at time he wrote Saturday morning letter.)

S had dinner with F Sunday night; F said he had been instructed to tell S that his services were much appreciated, and had been very valuable. In particular, that applied to his "explosion" Saturday afternoon.

Hils feels: Rusk took S channel very seriously at time, spent much time and attention with it; definitely influenced interpretation, and was basis for Trollope ploy. (Says Excomm was jubilant at 1000 Saturday morning, till new letter came in). F offer was only offer of inspection ((till Saturday morning letter?)), and F-S exchange Saturday afternoon the only brutal, explosive exchange known to Hils to convey mood to K.

Hughes checked out Keating claim of Oct 10, at the time, that there six IRBM sites; int comm had no basis for this; no refugee reports mentioned six, or total number; there were two good reports about Oct 18--could have been around earlier--but they referred to storage sites at Remedios. Hils thinks Keating got this out of the air.

(But consider position it put administration in, with their flat statements on "I know there is no evidence on missiles...I think it extremely unlikely they would put missiles in.")

14 May

Did K have reason to imagine that JFK might hold information tight till after election, or longer?

Sonn: crate evidence was available (to?) prior to Sept 19 estimate but was not distributed to estimators; Air Force analysts were convinced it was Il-28's. Item got in Bull one day toward end of September, but was withdrawn and order went out there were to be no further items included and no further speculations published on subject. Not mentioned publicly till Oct 22. He believed at time Admin. meant to withhold it till after election. K may have believed we knew it, drew same inference.

(Note: Bowles-Dobrynin conversation later, Oct 13; how did Bowles interpret this? What was plan? Why did we not confront, ask? Was there a "crisis" at news?)

Moreover, Sonn believed and believes that K thought we knew by Sept 13 at least--planes were flying, scratches were to be seen (by Sept 5? was that flight over right area--no--or did K know exactly what it might have seen? Or might he have thought we would have agent reports?) and took Sept 13 statement as evidence that JFK did not mean to announce or react.

But how could JFK fail--and how could K think he would fail--to release news or react, after statements of 4 and 13 Sept?

Sonn did believe, and belief was general, in week of discovery, that K intended to announce missiles in connection with Berlin, when they were ready, maybe the day after the election; K's statements connecting Berlin with after election did sink home, Thompson thesis that missiles were connected with Berlin was accepted, hence timing; moreover, pace suggested this. (It was not immediately clear when they would be operational. Also, it was not clear that any were operational then; it seemed likely that K would regard deterrence as better, against invasion or attack, when all were operational, and "one might go off.")

Sonn doesn't think ExComm did consider withholding news (note how many ~~xxx~~ knew by Oct 15; did this many, outside of int analysts, know of Il-28's?). But they were concerned about one possibly going off, perhaps captured or controlled by Cubans! Couldn't sit still with that possibility!

McN said (Sonn, Hil) from Tuesday to Thursday: in purely military strategic terms, no problem, just extra targets, makes no difference; no crisis (this was interpreted by I&R as arguing for inaction; but was this McN's recommendation, or was he merely abstracting from political considerations to give comment on wartime implications?)

Weiss: in my thesis, don't emphasize election so much in Cuban case as factor that K thought would make JFK so reluctant to announce to public; election may have been tactical consideration, adding insurance, but W. thinks main consideration would have been record of previous two years, leading K to think that JFK would accept move; hence, K would have been about as willing to do it in spring, or after election. (?) Berlin 1961 would be exception in pattern (though, Berlin Wall). ((But, maybe that taught K that the overt challenge was mistake, would force JFK's hand; what would get him to "cooperate" would be fait accompli, in public's eyes; public must not have proof too early, JFK must not be forced to give proof too early and ~~xxx~~ public must not have proof later that JFK knew earlier.

22 Oct. Cover letter to K with speech. Refers to discussion at Vienna, Pres assertion there that US would not allow SU to take actions overturning present balance of power.

((Balance then conceived as "equal"? But now conceived as unequal, favoring US; we were, in effect, still proposing to prevent K from producing drastic change in balance of power, in direction of equality. Meanwhile, K had vigorously rejected this position at Vienna, refused to renounce efforts to change the balance of power in Russia's favor.))

Had given specific example there of possible miscalculation of US determination: trying to destroy US rights of access to Berlin.

Do not mistake moderation of current action for lack of determination; we are determined that missiles shall be removed. I hope you will act prudently, have snips comply with quarantine.

K reply, 23 Oct: cover letter with public reply. You have no right to take action. Weapons of Cuba, whatever their character, are for defensive purposes. Cuba is small, cannot be a threat to giant US.

Reply (?) 23 (?) Oct: You started this, by putting missiles in Cuba

R reply to quarantine: put yourself in my position; ultimatum; cannot comply; ~~xxxx~~ piratical; have ordered captains not to comply.

((But had ordered them to turn morning of 23 Oct, before OAS vote; they changed course about noon; Navy didn't report this to ExComm till 24 Oct; announced 25 Oct.))

Reply, 25 (?) Oct: refers to Shipments in August, Pres statements.

You made deceptive statements, in public and private, assuring that no offensive weapons were being sent. On the basis of these assurances, I ~~xx~~ publicly restrained those who wanted to take action. Then I learned that recently you had been installing missiles.

26 Oct letter at US-Emb in Moscow at 1000, probably sent about 0930 Washington time; it didn't begin arriving till about 1800 (discussed at ExComm meeting at 2000).

F met with S about noon, Wash time; F called earlier (when?).

Sou infers F offer sent earlier than letter, as it arrived; but times seem consistent with F offer being conceived at same time or later than letter, transmitted to F about same time or even after letter sent. Makes sense to me that F offer was a specification of vague "proposal" in letter ((which says only that if US would give guarantee... then situation would change, everything would different; this would destroy need for technicians. Can't speak for C but he would no longer have need for mobilization. & I propose: you guarantee drop quarantine; we would (send no more arms?); then necessity for weapons you term offensive would disappear.)) Reply to F might have signalled: ~~xx~~ couple of days before US action (?); and, highly likely that this offer would be accepted if others failed; ~~xxxxxx~~

continued:

if this had failed, no use trying tougher one, in private let alone in public; 27 Oct letter--sent about 24 hours after 26 Oct letter, and after S reply to F (presumably, after receipt of F report in Moscow) may have been public probe, public in part because hope of generating public support for it (also, to speed delivery?)

((Sie: Rusk maintains emphatically that 27 Oct letter was a result of public suggestions by Lippman on 25 Oct and Kreisky (Lippman not available for reflection in Moscow in time for 26 Oct letter?))

(Note: US couldn't charge "bad faith" because even if they had been public, neither 26 Oct letter nor F's "question" could be described as a commitment to a definite offer. E.g., 26 Oct letter doesn't mention Turkey, but doesn't say that missiles would be removed, either. The "necessity" for them would disappear (not necessarily missiles)--xxxxxx SU had denied necessity for them even before crisis, but had put them in anyway--but that could mean, they are then available for bargaining, e.g., against those equally "unnecessary" missiles in Turkey. The F offer, in contrast, was a specific trade, in which Turkey did not figure: but was purely hypothetical.

Acceptance of F offer did not bind K at all (or US); but it revealed acceptability of this to US, thus gave him strong basis for believing he could get at least this; in absence of this, he might not have felt free to spend time probing, in view of other signals.

Sou, Sie: tendency of ExComm officials to deprecate F-8 exchange in view of 26 Oct letter; but would that not have appeared quite ambiguous if the F offer were not available to make if specific? Note that our reply of 27 Oct is essentially to F offer, not to 26 Oct letter.

By sending F offer, K in effect got an immediate reply to his 26 Oct letter, read in a form favorable to US; in effect, he had US public reply of 27 Oct on the night of 26 Oct or early morning of 27 Oct: probably before sending 27 Oct letter. ((whereas public impression--and of how many members of ExComm, staff?)), he didn't get reply to either before he had sent both.

Big US decision of afternoon of 27 Oct was not to combine two letters but to ignore 27 Oct letter; meanwhile, threatening (as retaliation to Anderson, or to further shootdowns? Or, just as "retal" to failure to remove missiles? What was threatened, or xxxxxx implied? If Anderson stressed, this suggests action against SAMs; if missiles, missiles. What was feeling of ExComm about Anderson, and about implications of prior commitments about U-2s and political consequences of inaction. Was K "forcing our hand"? (See Sie account of Ball reaction)).

((

McC's role fairly creditable. Honeymoon messages, late Aug --third week in Sept: took evidence of SAMs as confirming suspicions; as compared to analysts, gave more weight to possibility of irrational, radical, out-of-pattern move by K; and gave more weight to actual advantages of move to K. Criticized est. of Sept 19 ((often may give verbal dissent from est--verbal footnote--in giving it to Pres))

((Did analysts give too much weight to the "obvious" risks of move: not only judging perception of these risks by Sovs, without direct evidence, but judging "actual" risks--in effect, predicting decisions of US Pres. How well qualified is anybody now--and in particular, Sov experts or intelligence analysts in general--to make this prediction? How much was it based on general considerations, generalized circumstances, rather than on a variety of specific circumstances, or a predicted range of circumstances?))

((McC tendency to have great confidence in his intuitions; reluctant to change in face of analysts evidence or argument. ~~ix~~ Was he then also unfettered by knowledge or experience of weight of past evidence on K behavior?

Yet, how much evidence was there for analysts--Kent--implicit assumption that K's behavior was stable, rational, informed, predictable, prudent? Let alone, that this is fair assumption for most political leaders.))

What was purpose of Sov deception? Who were they trying to deceive? Note pattern of making tough, deceptive statement after having invalidating it, by action, private statement: ships would run blockade (to businessman, JFK on 24 Oct, after publicly known ships had turned away (though still question of remaining ships: only 2 dry cargo?); Tass-man statement on 23 Oct; 27 Oct letter;

Can they have hoped to deter recon? Or to convey message that they would not reveal missiles, if we didn't, before election? What did members of ExComm make of Sov intent in statements? How did they react?

What is K theory of significance of US elections? Had he promised not to embarrass, on 23 Aug (to Sorenson?) Might he have thought we were hoping, above all, that he would not break news before election?

Dobrynin-Sorenson, Aug 23, Sept 6; ~~Dobrynin-Sorenson~~ Bol Oct 1 (Oct 23);
(Aug. 29?)
Dob-Bowles, Oct 13; Gromyko Oct 18.

Hils: S may have told F, 2 or 3 days.
Gore: 26 Oct: 2

V: if what you have right to do to Cuba, we have right to do to Turkey or Iran. (But Turkey and Iran are weak, no threat).

If balance is equal, equal rights.

We will not disturb balance; No, we will not commit ourselves not to expand, not to upset balance...

We had miscalculated, e.g. in Cuba. Interpretation: you made a mistake in Cuba.

Why secrecy of comm? Reluctant to make explicit ultimatum; embarrass K, make it hard to accept?

See Vienna,

Yarmolinsky, May 16

Told of missiles by McN about 0730 Oct 16. McN reaction then was: This shows how stupid it was to draw that line; I ~~xxxx~~ advised against it.

McN thought there might not have had to be a crisis if JFK hadn't drawn the line.

Y. thinks it unlikely that JFK would have made the firm, precise commitment he did if he had thought there was much chance it might be called. He made it public only for political reasons. ((This doesn't say he wouldn't have wanted to move; reflects general politician's aversion to making advance commitments when he doesn't have to.))

If commitment had not been made, SU move would not have had the ominous significance it did: of "calling" us; of putting Pres and US prestige so clearly at stake.

((Would K success have been so marked if it had not been made in face of US commitment? Perhaps so: because fact of putting missiles into Caribbean--still apart from military significance--would have been still noted; in effect, people would say we should have drawn a line, or would have if situation really favored us, or if we had any guts or were really willing to use force.

Still, if K expected to succeed despite commitment, then commitment would make his victory still greater (just as "naming" K by JCK on Oct 22 made success greater, though perhaps less likely). Thus, though JFK's public statements of 4 and 13 Sept, though they might have raised in K's mind the probability of a US counter, might also have raised the potential rewards in K's mind and might have left the prob of US action still low (especially if he thought JFK already ~~xxx~~ knew of plan for missiles, in addition to his willingness to swallow SAMs, etc.)

((Did K realize what a difference the difference between SAMs and MRBMs was? The main, essential difference is that the US public thought there was a difference. Were they excited about SAMs? Not too much? But Russian troops might have been a different matter; maybe Il-28's.

Why was there not a SAM crisis? An Il-28 crisis? A build-up crisis?

Given that US public was so sensitive to missiles--given that their presence would inevitably cause public pain, hence cause politicians pain--then failure to move effectively would raise questions about US power and will to use its power to avert or remove pain and satisfy public and leaders' feelings: ~~xxxxxx~~ regardless of whether or not the Russian move constituted a "real danger" or would make a "real difference" in a war.

Moreover, willingness to cause such pain in US would suggest to observers that K--presumably in a good position to know, presumably a prudent man--regarded JFK power and resolution with contempt, skepticism: especially with JFK commitment, but even without.

In Cuba, some Sov activities observed for first time ((likewise, US)): so: a) they couldn't be fully interpreted at the time; (b) in future, it will be possible to interpret them, thanks to Cuba.

((Same for US; question: impact of Cuba on ability to interpret each other's behavior; and to communicate if desired, in future crises. WHAT ALERTING/PREPARATORY PROCEDURES HAVE STILL NEVER BEEN OBSERVED, ON ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER? What surprises, confusions, might this create in future, intense crisis? Can these serve to define levels of intensity, as yet unobserved? What will serve to flag the unprecedented nature of a future crisis? Are top decision-makers aware of degree of unprecedentedness of US actions they may contemplate? and of difficulties of interpretation, as well as of signal of intent?

Was US dispersal in Cuba the waste of a powerful signal (Bennington, Schelling); in what ways did use then condition impact of a similar act in future?

interpreted & it is
Sovs: tested possible Air Defense fight dispersal plan, beginning in May 62; crisis took place in fall, when Sov forces are at peak proficiency (for Berlin crisis?); may have restricted preparations to a minimum to ensure strategic surprise.

Sovs Sept 11 alert appeared to be a response to militant US announcements ((How was it interpreted by US decision-makers? As political ploy?)) *(included mention that alert/missile)*

In retrospect, appears to have been initiated as a response to the 7 Sept request by JFK for authority to fall up reserves because, unknown to US, this call-up coincided with the initial introduction of missiles into Cuba. In all probability, the call-up caused grave concern in the USSR about possible US knowledge of their 'missile venture'. This alert was reduced in late Sept or early Oct after the Sovs realized that their missile venture was continuing undetected by the US.

MC: *ear*
((But 5 Sept recon would not have disclosed missiles; they might have started arriving by 7 Sept (could they have by 2 Sept?), but Sovs knew no flights (might they have feared 5 Sept flight showed something? e.g., 29 Aug flight showed vehicles and construction material at IRBM sites))

15 Oct: standby alert, probably because of Sov realization that venture had been detected by 14 Oct flight

16 Oct: activation of Sov Far East weather reporting for North America for first time (?)

23 Oct. Sat Forces placed on alert

Concept and execution clearly indicate that Sov authorities made no appreciable effort to prevent or delay US detection by aerial recon during the deployment phase. /of the offensive weapon
It is believed that the most likely explanation is that they judged the risk of a US military reaction to be very slight.

((Mandelstam: they had camouflage nets with them--this degree of preparation--but didn't use them till late in October (date?); first camouflage in response to low-level flights on 23 Oct was natural cover (?). M. guessed a failure by local commander to carry out camouflage plan; or perhaps nets were not loaded correctly, etc. One analyst told him nets would have delayed recognition a couple of weeks. Infrared gear was not being used, though available (?).))

((Did Sovs believe it possible to prevent detection? Report says would have been difficult to conceal IRBM sites; though could have delayed starting these.))

Concurrency: Sov concept obviously did not envision the initial establishment of an island defense in order to test US reaction and screen the subsequent introduction of strat missile forces.

((So McC guess was wrong in reasoning, though right in conclusion. But does failure to use SA-2's against U-2's indicate indifference? Would Sovs have been willing to shoot down a U-2? Report doesn't comment.

SA-2's could have been more deterrent if they had activated radars. Or would they? They were deterrent, weren't they; overflights did cease for over a month. (Were SA's a factor?) Might this have been hoped by Sovs? (presumably not, given failure to activate).))

~~It~~ (In concluding that Sovs regarded risk as low, failure to use SA-2's is one ground; another, no apparent effort to minimize time during which some MRBM units were detectable before all of the MRBM units were operational--but would this be critical to US reaction, once some units were operational?

Third: failure to camouflage.

Special note: what was the mission?
The conclusion seems inescapable that the Sov authorities () chose to ignore the distinct possibility of US overflights in planning the Cuban operation. This choice seems inexplicable unless the Soviet leaders judged with considerable assurance that the US would acquiesce in the deployment of strategic missiles in Cuba--or at least that the US would not attempt to force their removal by reacting militarily--and hence that the possibility of US detection was not critical to the success or failure of the venture.

((But: no mention of the fact that this was not a departure from familiar pattern, but a reproduction of standard procedure in SU: careful ground screening, deceptive public statements and private statements, covered movements, but open to air recon; it does not have to be explained on ad hoc basis (this is to ignore organizational/procedural inertia, compartmentalization, lack of adaptation). Also, little attention to measures that were taken to cover and deceive; SU grounds for pessimism as to success; and alerts (discounted).

*(Might of Mandelstam? Of course, assuming, intention, extreme adaptation?)
Believe hypothesis that Opponent is a rational & informed decision-maker?)*

2.

Possibility considered that actual planners were unaware of or grossly underestimated US recon capabilities; seems unlikely. But reasons for dismissing are U-2 trial, and Sov recognition there of U. capabilities; and fact that Chief of Air Defense at that time became Chief of SRF. Can this be dismissed?

(Rules of the game): Having lived restively under the shadow of US strategic bases for more than a decade, the Sov leaders ~~xxx~~ probably have come to regard them, particularly in the age of the ICBM, as a disquieting but not major phenomenon of great power relations. Castro's Cuba provided K with ~~xxx~~ his first opportunity to establish an overseas military base. He may have felt confident that the US would understand the rules as he did that military bases on the opponent's periphery are facts of great power life which fall far short of a provocation to war.

((If so, he failed to see asymmetry of power as a rule of the game; or was ready to change it, in which case he could have foreseen resistance or possibility that US hadn't noticed it was time for a change.

Or: is it possible that bases really weren't as salient for SU, by now, as for US; i.e., that Turkey no longer "provokes" them to extent that Cuba does us? Is it possible he really underestimated: a) the degree to which this move would provoke us, or irritate us--aside from the likelihood of US response; b) the gains to him--or losses to us--which, in our judgment, he would have achieved if we had acquiesced? i.e., that one reason he judged likelihood of response as low is that he underestimated degree of motivation.))

Objectives:

Strategic change produced by Cuba would have been short-lived, given planned increases in US ICBM and Polaris deployment in 1963; reason for expecting success to be followed by attempt to achieve dramatic victory elsewhere, Berlin.

((Berlin 1962 was thus an Averted Crisis. Cuba 1962 is an example of a crisis in which Sov victory would have consisted precisely in establishing a base for a substantive victory in a subsequent crisis, or phase.

Les Crises en Chaine. (or: The Century of Crisis.)

Noise and Inference:

More than 200 reports refer to presence on Cuba of missiles before Jan 62. Numerous reports refer to construction activity and equipment observed during spring of 1962 in areas where SAM sites were located later; however, photography failed to reveal any such activity or equipment. But strong possibility that this report ng reflected influx into Cuba, beginning in early 1962, of Sov personnel (and vehicles?) somehow connected with the buildup beginning physically in late July.

((Hypothesis: A common pattern, like that in Cuba: Forerunners of later threat--perhaps personnel, rumors, phenomena not observable by air recon--give rise to exaggerated agent reports of observable activity; 2) photos disprove presence of such activity, and tend to discredit totally, or excessively (?) the agent reports; so that (3) later reports, based on firmer grounds, find preconceptions hardened against them, and reduced/delayed tendency even to accept risks and costs of checking them by further recon (note suspension of flights); especially if (4) photos do turn up phenomena that serves as alternative explanation for reports.

Typ II: Negative results from photos have--unjustifiably--a strong effect on expectations comparable to that of positive results; and have excessive weight in undermining positive agent reports.

3.

((Hyp II follows automatically if it is the case (Mandelstam) that top decision-makers (Ike?) really look seriously only at photos, SI, dismiss agent reports; then negative results from former are essentially the only evidence considered.

Task: analyze timing and content of data available only from agent reports.

In light of experience, evaluate relation of collateral sources and photos, SI; are they being best used to complement each other?))
Are collateral sources underused by top decision-makers? Should latter be wary of ~~examining~~ using other sources to invalidate totally the "smoke" shown by collateral sources?

Examine the total "noise" background of collateral sources.

Examine preconceptions which analysts, and decision-makers bring to evidence: not only gross ones (SU wouldn't do it)) but details of linkages (McC: If SA's come, can MRBM's be far behind?)

Southard: 21 April

Fomin told Scali, Sat morning (27 Oct) that K had not received reply from State before sending Sat. morning letter on Turkey-Cuba. This was blatantly untrue; Fomin got reply about 7:30-8 Friday night, must have sent it immediately, K would have had it about 12 hours before broadcast of Turkey letter.

((But: might Fomin know of a foulup in comm, or or delay in transmitting to K at other end? Consider delays in Moscow--Washington. Might K have been unavailable? What was means of transmission from Russian Embassy in Washington? How does Hot Line change this?))

((Who knew of Scali deal Friday night: before ExComm meeting? Was ExComm told? Who knew by Saturday-Sunday? Did some see the Friday night letter without knowing of Scali; how did they interpret it? Who knew on Saturday that there had been a Friday night answer to Scali; in effect, an answer to the Friday night letter?

What were beliefs of Ex Comm, President, as to whether K had received reply to Scali before sending Turkey letter?

Were other channels being used simultaneously: Dobrynin-RK, Dobrynin--Thompson, Kohler-Gromyko? (Pachter). Were British in circuit? Friday night? Saturday?

S. believes: K got Scali reply Friday night, and this reassured him that US, interested in negotiating this deal, was unlikely to take violent action immediately; K had time to try Turkey deal.

((But how about Scali emphasis on "little time"?))

Question then becomes: What changed his mind 24 hours after Turkey letter?

S. answer: the "signal of utmost alarm." (See Pachter)

((Were there other channels as well?

Was threat specific? Did it unequivocally go beyond increasing the blockade? Was it regarded by JFK as absolute commitment? What did he foresee as possible, probable responses? When exactly was it sent? Relation to concern over retaliation against Turkey?

Is it possible there was direct answer Saturday night? Might retal. against Turkey ever have been specifically threatened? (S. thinks not).

Why didn't K use more of period allowed? (Analogy: immediate turning back of ships after speech?)

V(Why is signal held so tightly? Why are all private comms held quite so tightly? Has there been bad past experience on this?

S. had not considered possibility that U-2 shootdown, if accident, might have frightened K. (Note Pachter: according to RK, it did determine JFK to increase recon and blockade. And...?)

((How would "signal" of dismantling Turk missiles have appeared in combination with this? Would this be considered?

Who on ExComm, others, knew of Signal?

So. 21 April 2.

Southard started study with assumption that ~~Sov statements~~ the public record--and even the private record then available--did not support Administration claims of deliberate Sov deception; rather, that int. comm and Admin. had simply erred in their interpretations of Sov statements, had failed to see their emphasis on purposes, etc.

((Certainly Sept 11 statements and Grognyko statements lied in describing the role of the Sov "specialists"--and hence were extremely misleading.))

But S is now convinced that they were directly deceptive.
((Does Dobrynin-Sorenson talk completely confirm this?))

S. Study started with a directive from McC to analyse what it was ((not, whether?)) that we had done that had led ~~to~~ K to believe that he could get away with it.

Rostow criticised that study emphasized what we had done rather than the pressures on K to do what he did (S thinks R. could not have read appendix, which goes into this); but S thinks that former is more pertinent to examine, from point of view of learning from experience. ((? May be misleading.))

Rostow points to his memo of Aug '62, pointing to pressures on K, and possibility that they might lead him to: 1) improve strategic balance; 2) put pressure on Berlin; or 3) increase Cuba as militant base. But 1 and 3 did not lead Rostow to predict missiles in Cuba; rather, his paper indicated building up Cuba as a base for subversion.

Question is: do even the combination of pressures and reassuring signals add up to a strong explanation of K action? I.e., granted that they make K action more probable than if they did not apply, do they make it highly probable, or more probable than not? ((and how do they weigh against the unreassuring signals, the disincentives: and the ~~xxxx~~ inertia of past Sov patterns?)) Note that both signals and incentives were known to us well before fall of 1962; why did they not lead to prediction of missiles? Should they have?

((It is a plausible hypothesis that int. comm. is inhibited from taking "reassuring signals" fully; explicitly, or realistically into account, either consciously or in published results.))

S. thinks that if he had been estimating on Cuba, he too would have predicted against missiles: possible but unlikely; because it would be irrational of Sovs to do it. ((Why? Is that still clear?))

Thus; his "explanation" still leaves action unlikely; he is forced to regard it as "irrational": impulsive, erratic, wishful, reckless.

((S. tends to emphasize: K probably gave more weight, wishfully, to reassuring signals than he should. He doesn't consider as much that K may have given more weight to incentives--considered situation more urgent, alternatives worse--than he "should." How about "last change" aspect? How about effect of recent improvement in balance?))

1. How explain that missiles were transported clandestinely, but not constructed covertly?

2. How does installation and operation of SAMs in Cuba compare with practice elsewhere when SAMs have been deployed? With Soviet practice?
Have they ever activated SAMs piecemeal?

3. ~~What~~ Was Sept. 10 flight cancelled because of Chinat shootdown?

4. What if Aug. 30 and Sept 8 U-2 incidents had occurred prior to Aug. 29;
a) Would SAMs have been discovered so early?

b) In absence of flights, might collateral reports have caused more concern?
e.g., in absence of evidence on SAMs, suggesting alternative explanation?

5. Is absence of recon, because of incidents or weather, reflected in planning or declaratory activity? (Or are planning activities geared to the expectation that recon will continue or proceed soon, with no adjustment for unexpected delays?)

6. Is there a tendency to react to information-flow as if it closely corresponded to flow of events being observed? E.g., to react to sudden exposure to data as if external events had moved rapidly (e.g., increase of info on missiles between 16 and 18 Oct ~~and~~ because of increase in coverage; tendency to treat as if revealing crash activity? Sudden increases in identification of activities not previously covered or recognized; does this create crisis atmosphere? e.g., SA-2s after 29 Aug.; SA-2s in East Germany and SU)

Or does lack of newly confirming evidence create atmosphere that "nothing new is happening," even though lack may reflect absence of recon for weather or other reasons. Or, "something may be happening but there is no 'hard' evidence of it." E.g., Admin statements about missiles in period 5 Sept--14 Oct; or intell. statements about dismantling, 30 Oct--2 Nov.

Xx

7. Why knew of emergence of SAM system on 26-27 Oct in US? How was it interpreted, at the time? Who analysed it for ExComm?

8. How might this have been related to shootdown of U-2 on 27 Oct? When, in what sequence, did news of this come in? How was it interpreted, in various stages, by various people?

9. What evidence is there that SU considered concealment from high-alt photography possible?

10. Is there reason to believe that missiles did not come on ship prior to mid-Sept?

11. With what other Sov operations can this deployment be compared? What are differences, similarities: e.g., in secrecy, concurrency, site preparation, C&C, security, timing, manning? How much intelligence did we get out of it? Was this foreseeable by Sovs? (Was this reason for predicting Sovs wouldn't put base here?)

The U-2 and the Crisis

1. What was the relative importance of the roles of the photos in:

- a) Convincing intelligence analysts?
- b) Convincing top Presidential advisors?
- c) Convincing the President?
- d) Catching the attention of advisors, President?
- e) Earlier, supporting negative beliefs as to missiles?
- f) Establishing the relative credibility of various informants?
- g) Establishing the need for further information?
- h) Convincing Congress; the press; the public; allies; Soviets; UN.

(Note problem: earlier unsuitability of photographic evidence to convince these critics that missiles were not there; as in Missile Gap crisis.)

(Note McNamara's attempt to use photos in this role, after all, to show that missiles had left; but note the costs of such comprehensive revelations, and limited positive effects).

2. Photos, as information available to a limited group and not outside, create a "data differential" between that group and others including not only the public but the staff of the "elite." This may be reflected in a systematic difference of opinion (e.g., if "outside" group has access to, or is leaked, a part of the information available to elite, e.g., collateral reports or corresponding journalistic sources: Keating), where "elite" is unable to reveal that it has additional information, or what it is. Thus, the difference appears to the critic and to observers as revealing simply a difference in interpretation of the same data, revealing in turn a difference in preconceptions or goals. The photos (or other elite sources) may either negate the other evidence--as prior to Aug. 29, 62 (or ~~in~~ during 1953-60)--or suggest a different interpretation--as between Aug 29 and Oct 14 (SAMs)--or reinforce the other evidence--as after Oct 14. In the first case, the Administration will seem lethargic, inattentive, wishfully negligent, or bound by the inertia of preconceptions, etc--particularly to those who do have access to ~~an~~ opposing data and thus have a claim to be recognized by public as "informed experts" (note legacy of Gaither Committee, particularly ~~in~~ during 1953-60; general position of Congressional critics and non-profit "experts"). There is, in fact, often enough a basis for this charge, and it is difficult for the public to distinguish those cases in which this is not so (especially because security relating to the special information is often kept unusually well).

In latter two cases, Gov may be tempted to release photostats to support its case; but if it does not, it can now appear reckless, wishful, too ready to jump to conclusions on insubstantial evidence; fears as ~~its~~ to its probable future "false alarm rate" may arise, and precautionary measures taken by Allies and opponents.

To guard the source of its special information, elite may even be forced to take actions counter-indicating their possession of it. (This may arise when the data-differential refers to the existence of detailed plans or covert objectives. Note Nixon dilemma when JFK proposed aiding invasion of Cuba; the dilemma when Stevenson proposed stopping tests?

Notes on U-2 Crisis

3. Different impact of negative and positive results from photos. Distinguish between photos that negate other evidence--as when photos show definitely that there are no missiles on a particular site, contrary to specific reports--and photos that fail to confirm other evidence or to point in the same direction--as when photos failed to show that missiles were being dismantled, or showed conflicting indications.

Is it generally true that negative evidence from photos, or even failure to confirm other evidence, is given more weight at high levels than at lower levels of analysis, or more weight than it should get? Or, are there circumstances in which this occurs?

Even where the photos strongly negate some specific hypothesis of interest, there may be other specific hypotheses, or broader hypotheses, almost as plausible a priori, which these photos simply fail to confirm (or even support). Proponents of the earlier, discredited hypotheses will be motivated to generate such alternatives; less hurt by this specific evidence, and perhaps less vulnerable to this form of test. This motivation may discredit the search operation; yet the hypotheses it turns up may be worthy of consideration.

E.g.; a) Should the Administration have been as confident as it was (?) in the adequacy of U-2 coverage prior to May, 1960? What does Cuba affair tell us about this? How about MREM/IREMs?

b) How much confidence can be placed in photo evidence that all missiles were removed from Cuba?

c.

Can there be "hard" evidence of a negative nature, except as relating to a highly specific hypothesis? Are photos that fail to show certain phenomena treated as being as "hard" as if they distinctly showed other phenomena?

(Are there limits to the "hard" evidence to the point?)

John Whitman:

1. Process: ONE, BNE, USIB ; amount of coordination; role of DCI.
2. Unprecedented: Rostow panel, assignment of Whitman, sharp split between & DCI and ONE (roles of Harris, Hitchcock; Tiawell?)
3. Issues on SNIE: likelihood of Sov military response; relative likelihood of strong response to invasion, limited military attack.
4. Feeling by 22 Oct on likely Sov response to limited, controlled US response. reaction to blockade proposal.
5. W. Reaction to news (tola, "MCC was right") ; prior commitment to position because of MCC prodding of Kent.
6. Fear of effect on MCC/ONE.
7. ~~Do~~ Do analysts get timely, comprehensive info on private, verbal messages to SU? (didn't know about F-S). Do they ask, what tacit info is our whole posture and pattern of behavior and statements affecting opponent's expectations?
- 8.

John Hyland: in EE/ONE (Eastern Europe; SU) 5 June

~~xxx~~

1. Initial attitudes in CIA estimate, 16-17 Oct.
2. Reaction when told.
3. Interplay with McC. (McC certainty; theory; a nut; Rusk reaction)
4. memo over weekend; Kent attitude.
5. Konler interview: acted as if didn't know.
6. Turkey: our ~~hxxx~~ strategic territory, long before missiles put there; in Cuba, SU making free of "our" territory (what if they had created base, waited couple of years; eased in with subs, etc.)
7. Attitude to news of Il-28's; feeling that SU was "testing," faster than expected.
8. SNIE actually drafted last week in Aug (sure SAMs there). ~~xx~~ McC rejected Cuban group SNIE, brought in EE to consider military buildup, possibility of missiles.
9. McC attitude; wrong guesses.
10. Theories of Sov calculation: 1) now accepting big risk; ~~xxxxxxx~~ 2) Underestimating risk; 3) Hyland: desperation, severely pressed by need for improvement (last chance), led to wishful underestimation of risk; 4) (my?) risk not underestimated; but badly played by K, good circumstances for US, good playing by US;
11. Estimates played small role; discredited; worked mainly for McC, didn't influence him much; Pres relied on non-intell advisors and McC for predictions, didn't look to Estimates for predictions, analysis.
12. McC desire to bomb, hawk (eagle); but, prediction (early) of strong SU reaction (bomb Thule/ Berlin, SEAsia, Turkey, Iran) to attack, especially if any Russian soldiers killed; thought gov should prepare.
13. K interview with Gandni; fake mobilization, deployment, alert. question whether war would have followed.
14. No question put to ONE on effect of action/preparation/ultimatum (though memoto MCC, early, on ultimatum--instead of blockade; thought this would only lead to counterpressure by SU). No tendency to initiate such an estimate. If asked, would probably not have believed in brilliantly effective style of handling.
15. Sovs surprised (Zorin reaction; failure to hedge at all, e.g., to install SAMs before letting us see missiles). Effectiveness of our secrecy; due to what? Very bad "crisis management" by Sovs.
16. Process; special group in ONE; work on estimates; work for McC;
17. Process of producing SNIE, LIE (proposal accepted by Kent; draft; considered by Board; Board member chairman of est, intell comm representatives (e.g., Sohn) aid solicited, conference; USIE
18. Question of asking, in SNIE: 1) But suppose he got away with it, what would it be worth? 2) What would it take for him to get away with it; What might keep us from attacking? 3) What would it take for us to get away with it?

WHAT COULD KHRUSHCHEV HAVE DONE TO:

- 3 1. Deter overflights between July--Oct 62? Aug-Sept 62?
- 1 2. Prevent JFK from committing US to respond?
- 4 3. Defuse US response between 14--22 Oct.
- 2 4. Delay recognition of missiles and sites by U-2?

reduce his risks?

get away with US action

" blockade, protest; trade; SD advance?

How could JFK have convinced K?

dissuaded K?

WHAT DIFFERENCES COULD HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE TO:

1. K's expectations of US response: a) prior to decision; b) prior to July 62; c) prior to mid-Sept 62; d) prior to Oct 22?
2. US interpretation of SU motives.
3. US expectation of SU response to various US counteractions.
4. US willingness to blockade; b) to follow blockade with attack; c) to precede blockade by attack.
5. Chance that Sov move would trigger an unwarned US strike.
6. JFK willingness to commit himself to resist offensive deployment.
7. Allied acceptance of US: a) failure to consult
b) failure to inform earlier
c) proposed course of action
d) more violent action
e) trades, if proposed
8. K's degree of belief in JFK's public commitments: in general; regarding Cuba.
9. US willingness to blockade (e.g., belief that deployment was ~~in~~ complete? Prior Allied knowledge? Sov threats to US, public, Allies? UN attitude? OAS acceptance?)
10. JFK's feeling of having been deceived by K.
11. US willingness to overfly at all, Sept-Oct 62?
12. US disbelief that Sovs would move in MRBMs.

Wasn't K's behavior getting away with it?

WHAT IF:

21. U-2 overflight of Sakhalin of Aug 30 and Chinat loss of 8 Sept (relative importance of these?) had occurred prior to Aug 29? *Between Mac left.*

- a) flight schedule
- b) conclusions/expectations on SAMs
- c) conclusions on missiles
- d) relative weight to collateral sources
- e) sense of urgency; fever chart of crisis
- f) public assertions, commitments; subsequent response.

2. ~~X~~ SAMs had not been discovered Aug 29 (because of weather, coverage, etc.):

- Impact on:
- a) disbelief in collateral sources;
 - b) expectation of missiles
 - c) willingness to check out later reports of missiles.

3. MRBMs had been discovered sooner, around mid-Sept? (clearly non-operational)
Impact on: (fewer)

- a) Shock, surprise;
- b) Willingness to attack immediately (higher, because safer, smaller; or less, because less shocking, less threatening?)
- c) Ability to persuade public and Allies of need for 1) independent action;
- 2) fast action; 3) violent action.
- d) Convergence within ExComm.
- e) Imminence of deadline; effects of longer deadline.

4. MRBMs had been discovered later, or had been installed faster and more completely: warheads, more missiles, complete sites, ~~expanded sites~~ : a) alert; (b) non-alert.

Impact on:

- a) Relevance of blockade.
- b) Willingness to attack: increased threat vs. increased risk, difficulty, damage.
- c) Increased shock, and effects of this.
- d) Likelihood of fast, early response; and effects of this.

5. JFK had not made public distinction between offensive/defensive? Had not implied commitment to resist offensive?

WHAT IF:

6. If K had made deployment public, and preceded it with reassuring and justifying moves and statements? (including Cuban request, allegations of US aggressive plans, assurance of Sov control, reference to Turkey, freedom of seas...)

a) Reaction of Allies, public; OAS.

b) Effect of move, if successful, on SU bargaining improvement over Berlin.

(If US had acquiesced, it would be under Allied pressure, lack of Sov deception or immediate threat, no explicit JFK commitment; no shock or panic reaction in fall '62;

c) Effect on domestic politics (lacking period of allegation and denial, JFK commitments).

7. K had, prior to Oct 22, leaked facts and reassurances to US Allies, e.g., Britain?

8. K had given no grounds for charging deception? K had actually informed JFK privately?

9. Keating and others had not charged presence of missiles? Presence of buildup?

10. Deployment had taken place in 1961, prior to exposure of Missile Gap? After exposure of Missile Gap?

11. ~~After~~ Castro had exposed, denounced U-2 flights prior to Aug 29? After Aug 29? Activated SAMs? Fired SAM? Shot down U-2?

Questions for McGeorge Bundy

1. Fever chart of expectations, concerns.
2. Relative influence on expectations of: various Sov statements; Sept 28 letter; Sept 11 statement; McCone; estimates; "high-level Sovietologists; own appreciation of Sov goals, perceptions, tactics.
3. Most influential "deception". Private channel mentioned by JFK. Any little-known Sov statements on deception; on their expectation that we would discover by recon; on their estimates? Conscious estimate of their willingness to deceive?
4. Why not more specific queries on private channel, or to Dobrynin?
5. Motives, expectations leading to Sept 4 statement? Relation to NSAM 181? Sept 13 warning? (How much deterrent; how much reassurance, on Sept 4; how much answer to political opposition?)
What if expectation of MRBMs had been higher? e.g., if McCone had been around; if Sovs had introduced missiles elsewhere; if estimates had put higher?
6. Effect on later problems, responses, of these JFK warnings, commitments.
7. Personal response to news: surprise, emotion, interpretation, view of responses. Had suspicion been growing? Who did McG tell? What did he do, think about?
8. President's response; above. Where was he Sunday night? ~~Was~~
9. Reaction to deception; interpretation of Sov motives in deception?
10. What if: a) no deception; b) no Pres commitments (e.g., no Keating); c) Sovs had informed JFK: August; Pre-Sept statements; pre Oct 14; pre Oct 22? What if they told Allies;
11. What if Sovs had exploited SAMS or protest to stop U-2s? Role of incidents on Sept 10 meeting. What if missiles had been discovered earlier? Fear of incidents before election; effect of Dobrynin Sept 6 reassurance?
12. What if missiles hadn't been found till they and SAMs were operational?
13. Distribution of Sept 28 letter. Interpretation; effect on later expectations (e.g., on Sov resistance to blockade; on Sov interference in Berlin.)
14. How close to immediate air strike? What would have triggered? How would it have come out?
15. Decision to focus on K/SU rather than Castro; who, when, why?
16. Decision to emphasize deception in private communications to K, then and later.
17. Sequence of attitudes on trades as means of getting missiles out; what was JCEK's desire on Saturday afternoon, evening. What arguments were decisive?
18. When would we have released word on IL-28s?
19. Why did K think he could get away with it? Why didn't he believe threats? Why didn't we pick up this possibility? What finally convinced him?

Sunday questions:

20. ~~What could we have done if?~~ How did election figure in Administration statements responses, recon, dissemination, ?

21. Why wasn't recon increased from July in view of: a) SU buildup; peculiar features: size, pace, SU personnel (how were these read?); H) McCone; d) commitment to surveillance; e) bad weather; f) imminent loss of overhead recon?

22. How could K have improved his chances?

23. Have procedures of SG changed since Cuba?

24. What thinking had been done by SG, Pres, on what we might do--and how effective it might be--prior to Sept 4, 13 statements, or between Sept 20--Oct 16?

25. What if K had not gotten out, or shot more planes, Sunday morning? Chances of initiative on trade? Arguments against trade, Saturday night?

26. Interpretation of F-S; (other? RFK-Dob, Thompson-Dob?) Friday night letter; Saturday morning letter.

27. Expectations of effect of ultimatum. Interpretation of shootdown. Attitude toward political track as of Saturday afternoon.

28. What surprised Khrushchev during crisis; why? What did he expect?

29. What surprised ExComm members during crisis; any of their own or each others' reactions? Allied reactions? Continued SU deception? SU backdown?

How well would our own moves have been foreseen earlier? e.g., Presidential choices.

30. Intelligence process in retrospect. Sensitivity over recon incidents; restrictions on dissemination (good?); skepticism toward McCone, agents, refugees; confidence in SI; assumptions on speed on Sovx movements;

31. Private channel in retrospect: before crisis.

32. Had we "overcommunicated" a concern for legality (were they too reassured by the legality of their actions and the illegality of ours?): i.e., had we failed to communicate conditions under which we would pursue "illegal" action to protect our power and security?

Questions for McNamara

1. Fever chart of expectations, early August on.
2. Attitude to Sept 4 statement; reserve authority; Sept 13 necessary?
3. Evaluation of political implications, motives.
4. What if expectation of missiles had been somewhat higher?
5. Attitude to McCone's predictions.
6. Relative influence of: estimates; McCone; Sov statements; own ev. other "experts".
- 6a: Influence of U-2 incidents on Sept 10 decisions.
7. On first learning (when?): a) surprise; b) reaction; c) view of a. considerations, payoffs, expectations;
8. Attitude on: immediate strike; warning; political route/ trades; air s after blockade; likelihood of K backdown. When did blockade--strike (threat) emerge?
9. F-S, Friday night letter; interpretation. Saturday morning letter. Role in fashioning response. Interpretation of U-2 shootdown. Attitude on miss rendering IREMs non-operational, removing them: Saturday night; Sunday.
10. Importance of getting missiles out; importance of method; why? Military vs. political motives.
11. Who did early calculations on requirements for air strike, effects? How close was Pres to that? What would have triggered it?
11a.
12. What if K hadn't backed down, or shot more planes, Sunday morning?
13. Was blockade/preparation for strike seen as likely to get missiles out? What hopes for ultimatum?
14. Specific basis for fear of retaliation against Turkey; probability?

Questions~~x~~ for S and M:

1. How did the authors' own guesses or preconceptions change in the course of their study? What new patterns emerged in the course of it? What hypotheses were disconfirmed?
2. What, divergent, or invalid, beliefs were found to be held by other students, and by participants? What "wrong lessons" may have been learned?
3. What conclusions are sensitive to information not available then to participants, or to some important participants? To public?
4. What sorts of data did not authors not have adequate access to? What sorts couldn't they refer to?
5. What questions are left hanging? What major uncertainties remain?
6. What impressions were acquired as to patterns of dispute, inference or behavior that have also arisen in other crises?
7. What agency differences emerged in interpretation, prediction, policy, management: prior to and during crisis?
8. How well do staff and agency inputs to ExComm reflect the actual preoccupations, goals, predictions of members?
9. What did individual ExComm members fear, if they did nothing?

Source/evidence for:

- 1) ~~Jan 1962~~ that K intended to ~~xxx~~ improve strategic balance.

Any chance that actual changes in balance of spring '62 seemed to make venture safer (than in fall '61, for example)?

4. How would missile deployment have "strengthened K's bargaining position" over Germany? What circumstances were critical to this; what would have affected result?

e.g., was it important to present US with surprise? How would disclosure have been made? Was it important to surprise U.S. Allies?

Would K have expected JFK to commit himself in Sept? ~~xxx~~ Might K have avoided this...by reducing secrecy, by private disclosure, public disclosure?

What alternative modes of ~~xxxxxx~~ procedure were open to K, and why were they probably rejected (if considered)?

5. Given various advantages of successfully installing missiles in Cuba: were these given adequate weight in earlier estimates that they would not install? What do authors conclude about estimating process, preconceptions?

To what extent did it serve SU purposes to put missiles in Cuba, vs. other locations within MRBM range? Did they take into account the peculiar disadvantages, in terms of U.S. readiness to respond, sensitivity?

Did US commitments actually serve as incentive to install, to show up US bluff and demoralize Allies?

6. Given incentives to install, and given reasons for disbelieving JCK commitments: what could JFK have said, and what could US have done, to convince K that deployment was unprofitable? Prior to 1962; prior to Aug-9 1962; between July-Sept 1962?

Questions for RFK

1. Fever chart of expectations, concerns, from early August.
2. Discussion with K; discussion with Dobrynin, early August; Sept-Oct? Memcons?
3. Role in NSAM 181; attitude on Sept 4 statement; Reserve authority; . What if MRBMs thought somewhat more likely?
4. Reaction to Dobrynin Sept 6 statements; SU Sept 11 statement; reason for US Sept 13 statements. How were Sov statements interpreted? (including Sept 28)
5. Interpretation of Sov deception; what was effective; ~~what~~ how much did it influence; reaction on learning of deception; effect on our problem, responses; interpretation of Sov motives. *Why did we not identify?*
6. Bolshakov story. Memcon? Was this "private channel" referred to by JFK?
7. Interpretation of JFK problem, as of Oct 16.
8. Attitude on air strike after blockade; trades.
9. Interview of Oct 27; relation to U-2 shootdown; exact timing; specificity of action threatened; what was contemplated; any reassurances? Degree of hope?
10. Influence of F-S conversations; interpretation Friday night of letter; reaction, interpretation of Saturday morning letter; considerations leading to US response.
11. What killed trade Saturday night; postponed?
12. Interpretation of why K got out...Sunday morning?
13. What if: a) no deception; b) use of SAMs to keep out recon; c) K told allies; (would smaller number of MRBMs have made a difference?);
Why didn't they shoot SAMs?
14. How did public warnings, commitments affect JFK problem? Political aspects?
15. What reaction to having only: Migs; Il-28's; troops? Subs?
16. Evaluation now of immediate air strike; how close ~~xxxx~~ did Pres come; what would have triggered?
17. Why had "communication" with K failed? Evaluation now of comm process.
18. How did RFK, JFK see election issues: Aug-Oct; Oct 16?
19. Evolution of blockade--preparation approach; expectations of success in getting missiles out; attitude on political route.
Bay of Pigs;
a) reports available?
b) Who judged operation could be deniable?
20. Role of F-S; evolution of tactic of reply to letters; reaction to U-2 incidents.

What to mention? Memcons? Intelligence? What to say. What to say?
What is relation of 20 items to election?
election

Questions for RFK

1. Fever chart of expectations, concerns, from early August.
- 2. Discussion with K; discussion with Dobrynin, early August; Sept-Oct? Memcons?
3. Role in NSAM 181; attitude on Sept 4 statement; Reserve authority; • What if MRBMs thought somewhat more likely?
4. Reaction to Dobrynin Sept 6 statements; SU Sept 11 statement; reason for US Sept 13 statements. How were Sov statements interpreted? (including Sept 28)
- 5. Interpretation of Sov deception; what was effective; ~~what~~ how much did it influence; reaction on learning of deception; effect on our problem, responses; interpretation of Sov motives. *Why didn't we see this?*
- 6. Bolshakov story. Memcon? Was this "private channel" referred to by JFK?
7. Interpretation of JFK problem, as of Oct 16.
8. Attitude on air strike after blockade; trades.
- 9. Interview of Oct 27; relation to U-2 shootdown; exact timing; specificity of action threatened; what was contemplated; any reassurances? Degree of hope?
- 9. Influence of F-S conversations; interpretation Friday night of letter; reaction, interpretation of Saturday morning letter; considerations leading to US response.
11. What killed trade Saturday night; postponed?
12. Interpretation of why K got out... Sunday morning?
13. What if: a) no deception; b) use of SAMs to keep out recon; c) K told allies; (would smaller number of MRBMs have made a difference?);
Why didn't they attack 5-4-4?
14. How did public warnings, commitments affect JFK problem? Political aspects?
15. What reaction to having only: Migs; II-28's; troops? Subs?
16. Evaluation now of immediate air strike; how close ~~how~~ did Pres come; what would have triggered?
17. Why had "communication" with K failed? Evaluation now of comm process.
18. How did RFK, JFK see election issues: Aug-Oct; Oct 16?
19. Evolution of blockade--preparation approach; expectations of success in getting missiles out; attitude on political route.
Bay of Pigs:
a) reports available?
b) Who judged operation could be deniable?
20. Role of F-S; evolution of tactic of reply to letters; reaction to U-2 incidents.

What to mention? Memcons: 1-14-47? 1-14-47? 1-14-47? 1-14-47?

1-14-47? 1-14-47? 1-14-47?

Questions for McGeorge Bundy

1. Fever chart of expectations, concerns.
2. Relative influence on expectations of: various Sov statements; Sept 28 letter; Sept 11 statement; McCone; estimates; high-level Sovietologists; own appreciation of Sov goals, perceptions, tactics.
3. Most influential "deception". Private channel mentioned by JFK. Any little-known Sov statements on deception; on their expectation that we would discover by recon; on their estimates? Conscious estimate of their willingness to deceive?
4. Why not more specific queries on private channel, or to Dobrynin?
5. Motives, expectations leading to Sept 4 statement? Relation to NSAM 181? Sept 13 warning? (How much deterrent; how much reassurance, on Sept 4; how much answer to political opposition?)
What if expectation of MRBMs had been higher? e.g., if McCone had been around; if Sovs had introduced missiles elsewhere; if estimates had put higher?
6. Effect on later problems, responses, of these JFK warnings, commitments.
7. Personal response to news: surprise, emotion, interpretation, view of responses. Had suspicion been growing? Who did McG tell? What did he do, think about?
8. President's response; above. Where was he Sunday night? ~~Was~~
9. Reaction to deception; interpretation of Sov motives in deception?
10. What if: a) no deception; b) no Pres commitments (e.g., no Keating); c) Sovs had informed JFK: August; Pre-Sept statements; pre Oct 14; pre Oct 22? What if they told Allies;
11. What if Sovs had exploited SAMS or protest to stop U-2s? Role of incidents on Sept 10 meeting. What if missiles had been discovered earlier? Fear of incidents before election; effect of Debyrnin Sept 6 reassurance?
12. What if missiles hadn't been found till they and SAMs were operational?
13. Distribution of Sept 28 letter. Interpretation; effect on later expectations (e.g., on Sov resistance to blockade; on Sov interference in Berlin.)
14. How close to immediate air strike? What would have triggered? How would it have come out?
15. Decision to focus on K/SU rather than Castro; who, when, why?
16. Decision to emphasize deception in private communications to K, then and later.
17. Sequence of attitudes on trades as means of getting missiles out; what was JOCK's desire on Saturday afternoon, evening. What arguments were decisive?
18. When would we have released word on IL-28s?
19. Why did K think he could get away with it? Why didn't he believe threats? Why didn't we pick up this possibility? What finally convinced him?

Sunday questions:

20. ~~What could we have done if?~~ How did election figure in Administration statements responses, recon, dissemination, ?

21. Why wasn't recon increased from July in view of: a) SU buildup; peculiar features: size, pace, SU personnel (how were these read?); b) McCone; d) commitment to surveillance; e) bad weather; f) imminent loss of overhead recon?

22. How could K have improved his chances?

23. Have procedures of SG changed since Cuba?

24. What thinking had been done by SG, Pres, on what we might do--and how effective it might be--prior to Sept 4, 13 statements, or between Sept 20--Oct 16?

25. What if K had not gotten out, or shot more planes, Sunday morning? Chances of initiative on trade? Arguments against trade, Saturday night?

26. Interpretation of F-S; (other? RFK-Dob, Thompson-Dob?) Friday night letter; Saturday morning letter.

27. Expectations of effect of ultimatum. Interpretation of shootdown. Attitude toward political track as of Saturday afternoon.

28. What surprised Khrushchev during crisis; why? What did he expect?

29. What surprised ExComm members during crisis; any of their own or each others' reactions? Allied reactions? Continued SU deception? SU backdown?

How well would our own moves have been foreseen earlier? e.g., Presidential choices.

30. Intelligence process in retrospect. Sensitivity over recon incidents; restrictions on dissemination (good?); skepticism toward McCone, agents, refuges; confidence in SI; assumptions on speed on Sovx movements;

31. Private channel in retrospect: before crisis.

32. Had we "overcommunicated" a concern for legality (were they too reassured by the legality of their actions and the illegality of ours?): i.e., had we failed to communicate conditions under which we would pursue "illegal" action to protect our power and security?

Questions for McNamara

1. Fever chart of expectations, early August on.
2. Attitude to Sept 4 statement; reserve authority; Sept 13 statements. Was crisis necessary?
3. Evaluation of political implications, motives.
4. What if expectation of missiles had been somewhat higher?
5. Attitude to McCone's predictions.
6. Relative influence of: estimates; McCone; Sov statements; own evaluations; other "experts".
- 6a. Influence of U-2 incidents on Sept 10 decisions.
7. On first learning (when?): a) surprise; b) reaction; c) view of alternatives, considerations, payoffs, expectations;
8. Attitude on: immediate strike; warning; political route/ trades; air strike after blockade; likelihood of K backdown. When did blockade--strike (threat) pattern emerge?
9. F-S, Friday night letter; interpretation. Saturday morning letter. Role in fashioning response. Interpretation of U-2 shootdown. Attitude on ~~miss~~ rendering IRBMs non-operational, removing them: Saturday night; Sunday.
10. Importance of getting missiles out; importance of method; why? Military vs. political motives.
11. Who did early calculations on requirements for air strike, effects? How close was Pres to that? What would have triggered it?
12. What if K hadn't backed down, or shot more planes, Sunday morning?
13. Was blockade/preparation for strike seen as likely to get missiles out? What hopes for ultimatum?
14. Specific basis for fear of retaliation against Turkey; probability?

John Whitman:

1. Process: ONE, BNE, USIB ; amount of coordination; role of DCI.
2. Unprecedented: Rostow panel, assignment of Whitman, sharp split between & DCI and ONE (roles of Harris, Hitchcock; Tidwell?)
3. Issues on SNIE: likelihood of Sov military response; relative likelihood of strong response to invasion, limited military attack.
4. Feeling by 22 Oct on likely Sov response to limited, controlled US response. reaction to blockade proposal.
5. W. Reaction to news (told, "MCC was right") ; prior commitment to position because of MCC prodding of Kent.
6. Fear of effect on MCC/ONE.
7. ~~Do~~ Do analysts get timely, comprehensive info on private, verbal messages to SU? (didn't know about F-S). Do they ask, what tacit info is our whole posture and pattern of behavior and statements affecting opponent's expectations?
- 8.

John Hyland: in EE/ONE (Eastern Europe; SU) 5 June

~~xxx~~

1. Initial attitudes in CIA estimate, 16-17 Oct.
2. Reaction when told.
3. Interplay with McC. (McC certainty; theory; a nut; Rusk reaction)
4. memo over weekend; Kent attitude.
5. Kohler interview: acted as if didn't know.
6. Turkey: our ~~xxxx~~ strategic territory, long before missiles put there; in Cuba, SU making free of "our" territory (what if they had created base, waited couple of years; eased in with subs, etc.)
7. Attitude to news of Il-28's; feeling that SU was "testing," faster than expected.
8. SNIE actually drafted last week in Aug (sure SAMs there). ~~xx~~ McC rejected Cuban group SNIE, brought in EE to consider military buildup, possibility of missiles.
9. McC attitude; wrong guesses.
10. Theories of Sov calculation: 1) now accepting big risk; ~~xxxxxxxx~~ 2) Underestimating risk; 3) Hyland: desperation, severely pressed by need for improvement (last chance), led to wishful underestimation of risk; 4) (my?) risk not underestimated; but badly played by K, good circumstances for US, good playing by US;
11. Estimates played small role; discredited; worked mainly for McC, didn't influence him much; Pres relied on non-intell advisors and McC for predictions, didn't look to Estimates for predictions, analysis.
12. McC desire to bomb, hawk (eagle); but, prediction (early) of strong SU reaction (bomb Thule) (Berlin, SEAsia, Turkey, Iran) to attack, especially if any Russian soldiers killed; thought gov should prepare.
13. K interview with Gandhi; fake mobilization, deployment, alert. question whether war would have followed.
14. No question put to ONE on effect of action/preparation/ultimatum (though memoto MCC, early, on ultimatum--instead of blockade; thought this would only lead to counterpressure by SU. No tendency to initiate such an estimate. If asked, would probably not have believed in brilliantly effective style of handling.
15. Sovs surprised (Zorin reaction; failure to hedge at all, e.g., to install SAMs before letting us see missiles). Effectiveness of our secrecy; due to what? Very bad "crisis management" by Sovs.
16. Process; special group in ONE; work on estimates; work for McC;
17. Process of producing SNIE, NIE (proposal accepted by Kent; draft; considered by Board; Board member chairman of est, intell comm representatives (e.g., Sohn) aid solicited, conference; USIB
18. Question of asking, in SNIE: 1) But suppose he got away with it, what would it be worth? 2) What would it take for him to get away with it; What might keep us from attacking? 3) What would it take for him to get away with it?

Southard: 21 April

Fomin told Scali, Sat morning (27 Oct) that K had not received reply from State before sending Sat. morning letter on Turkey-Cuba. This was blatantly untrue; Fomin got reply about 7:30-8 Friday night, must have sent it immediately, K would have had it about 12 hours before broadcast of Turkey letter.

((But: might Fomin know of a foulup in comm, or or delay in transmitting to K at other end? Consider delays in Moscow--Washington. Might K have been unavailable? What was means of transmission from Russian Embassy in Washington? How does Hot Line change this?))

((Who knew of Scali deal Friday night: before ExComm meeting? Was ExComm told? Who knew by Saturday-Sunday? Did some see the Friday night letter without knowing of Scali; how did they interpret it? Who knew on Saturday that there had been a Friday night answer to Scali; in effect, an answer to the Friday night letter?

What were beliefs of Ex Comm, President, as to whether K had received reply to Scali before sending Turkey letter?

Were other channels being used simultaneously: Dobrynin-RK, Dobrynin--Thompson, Kohler-Gromyko? (Pachter). Were British in circuit? Friday night? Saturday?

S. believes: K got Scali reply Friday night, and this reassured him that US, interested in negotiating this deal, was unlikely to take violent action immediately; K had time to try Turkey deal.

((But how about Scali emphasis on "little time"?))

Question then becomes: What changed his mind 24 hours after Turkey letter?

S. answer: the "signal of utmost alarm." (See Pachter)

((Were there other channels as well?

Was threat specific? Did it unequivocally go beyond increasing the blockade? Was it regarded by JFK as absolute commitment? What did he foresee as possible, probable responses? When exactly was it sent? Relation to concern over retaliation against Turkey?

Is it possible there was direct answer Saturday night? Might retal. against Turkey ever have been specifically threatened? (S. thinks not).

Why didn't K use more of period allowed? (Analogy: immediate turning back of ships after speech?)

W(Why is signal held so tightly? Why are all private comms held quite so tightly? Has there been bad past experience on this?

S. had not considered possibility that U-2 shootdown, if accident, might have frightened K. (Note Pachter: according to RK, it did determine JFK to increase recon and blockade. And...?)

((How would "signal" of dismantling Turk missiles have appeared in combination with this? Would this be considered?

Who on ExComm, others, knew of Signal?

So. 21 April 2.

Southard started study with assumption that ~~xxxxxxx~~ the public record--and even the private record then available--did not support Administration claims of deliberate Sov deception; rather, that int. comm and Admin. had simply erred in their interpretations of Sov statements, had failed to see their emphasis on purposes, etc.

((Certainly Sept 11 statements and Gromyko statements lied in describing the role of the Sov "specialists"--and hence were extremely misleading.))

But S is now convinced that they were directly deceptive.
((Does Dobrynin-Sorenson talk completely confirm this?))

S. Study started with a directive from McC to analyse what it was ((not, whether?)) that we had done that had led ~~xx~~ K to believe that he could get away with it.

Rostow criticised that study emphasized what we had done rather than the pressures on K to do what he did (S thinks R. could not have read appendix, which goes into this); but S thinks that former is more pertinent to examine, from point of view of learning from experience. ((? May be misleading.))

Rostow points to his memo of Aug '62, pointing to pressures on K, and possibility that they might lead him to: 1) improve strategic balance; 2) put pressure on Berlin; or 3) increase Cuba as militant base. But 1 and 3 did not lead Rostow to predict missiles in Cuba; rather, his paper indicated building up Cuba as a base for subversion.

Question is: do even the combination of pressures and reassuring signals add up to a strong explanation of K action? I.e., granted that they make K action more probable than if they did not apply, do they make it highly probable, or more probable than not? ((and how do they weigh against the unreassuring signals, the disincentives: and the ~~xxxx~~ inertia of past Sov patterns?)) Note that both signals and incentives were known to us well before fall of 1962; why did they not lead to prediction of missiles? Should they have?

((It is a plausible hypothesis that int. comm. is inhibited from taking "reassuring signals" fully, explicitly, or realistically into account, either consciously or in published results.))

S. thinks that if he had been estimating on Cuba, he too would have predicted against missiles: possible but unlikely; because it would be irrational of Sovs to do it. ((Why? Is that still clear?))

Thus; his "explanation" still leaves action unlikely; he is forced to regard it as "irrational": impulsive, erratic, wishful, reckless.

((S. tends to emphasize: K probably gave more weight, wishfully, to reassuring signals than he should. He doesn't consider as much that K may have given more weight to incentives--considered situation more urgent, alternatives worse--than he "should." How about "last change" aspect? How about effect of recent improvement in balance?))

3. Baraz' paper of 12-19 Oct exemplified earlier Hilsman thesis that intell. should ~~xxxxxxx~~ consider consequences of U.S. actions; but also, role that this puts I&R into of imagining and quasi-evaluating U.S. policies. While still regarding their missiles as unlikely, he was asking: "But suppose they did put them in, What might we do, and what would the likely responses be to these actions, by SU, Cubans, allies, neutrals? "

(("How could the Sovs have achieved a fait accompli? How could they have prevented a US crisis--by convincing us that 'There was nothing to be done,' too late, no challenge to action, no opportunity to avert undesired change in the status quo. How could they have delayed our discovery; stayed our hand; increased risks to us of action, reduced incentives?

"How could they have triggered a US ~~a~~ direct attack on missiles? Did they know what it took? Might they have done it? "

Baraz:

If Sovs had earlier put MRBMs into a satellite: that would have made it look less unlikely that he would put them into Cuba; yet, it would still look like a "first" for him, a switch: It would still be outside the Warsaw Pact, a country without an alliance, not really, yet, fully within the Bloc, at such a long distance, with an unreliable leader.

((Were the peculiar advantages of putting missiles into Cuba, as opposed to other locations, taken fully into account? The various incentives so clear now to Southard? And how reliable were these former patterns held to be; how reliable, on past experience, was the very notion that "K doesn't break from his patterns"?))

One aspect of Hilsman--I&R line on including Castro in threats was: K's reaction when confronted with an indirect challenge was much more predictable; his reaction if confronted with a direct ultimatum much less so.

December 29, 1962

Dear Mr. President:

The Ambassador from Turkey presented an interpretation of Khrushchev's behavior in the Cuban crisis that might interest you; namely, that Khrushchev didn't know the difference in U.S. behavior between a Presidential and a Congressional election year.

He observed Khrushchev closely in New York in the fall of 1960 when he represented Turkey at the U.N. General Assembly. He noted then the impact on Khrushchev of seeing the U.S. rudderless during the election campaign, without even Lodge in attendance. He recalled that Jerry Wadsworth was moved into the breach. Khrushchev disported himself freely in that atmosphere. He is convinced that Khrushchev thought the same disarray would prevail during the election campaign of 1962.

We can leave it to the historians to check it out.

May I add a word. I remember with admiration the depth of your concern for the Cubans on the beach at the worst of the April 1961 affair, the night of the Congressional reception, when there was occasion for many other things to be on your mind. And I know that personal concern never left you. Their return now is thus doubly gratifying.

A Happy New Year.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ waet
W. W. Rostow

The President

Washington, D. C.

New York Times Mag, Nov. 18, 1962

Mr. K said that even though he had had many difficulties with General Eisenhower, he was certain that, if Eisenhower were President at this time, the problem of Cuba would have been handled in a much more mature manner. He stated he would hate to believe that President Kennedy's decision was due to the fact that we were having elections in the near future in the US. In any event, he observed Pres. Kennedy had embarked on a very, very dangerous policy, whether because of American histrionics or the President's youth.

April 26, 1963

1962 Cuba Quarantine Criticized and Defended at Law Parley

By ANTHONY LEWIS
Special to the New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 25 -- Last fall's quarantine of Cuba was praised and denounced today at a meeting of the American Society of International Law.

Prof. Quincy Wright of Columbia University was the principal critic. He said President Kennedy's move to force removal of Soviet missiles had been "an illegal and dangerous unilateral action."

"By the quarantine," Professor Wright said, "the United States resorted to forcible action that cannot be justified with our obligations under the United Nations Charter. You cannot reconcile the position we took with the obligation to settle all disputes by peaceful means."

Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State, said the quarantine was not a "legal issue" at all in the way that phrase should be understood.

Issue Held 'Above Law'

"In our system," he said, "the survival of states is above law--it must be."

Mr. Acheson suggested that no lawyer could really have said, in October, whether the quarantine was "legal" or "illegal." The law, he said, simply does not deal with such questions of ultimate power--power that comes close to the sources of sovereignty.

As a historical example he mentioned the refusal of the Court of King's Bench in the 14th Century to pass on the validity of the Duke of York's claim to the English Crown. The question was too much one of power, not of principle.

"It is harmful to believe," Mr. Acheson said, "that nations have accepted restraints on their sovereign power that prevent them from saving a way of life that respects law."

"I cannot believe that there are principles of law that say we must accept destruction of our way of life--I just cannot believe it."

Mr. Acheson said international law did play a part in the Cuban quarantine strategy and development --the important procedural role that law often plays.

Legal considerations were involved in the steps for approval of the quarantine by the Organization of American States. Legal avenues, Mr. Acheson said, permitted wise delay and consideration of the views of other governments.

Abram J. Chayes, legal adviser of the State Department, said "law was an important consideration" in the quarantine decision. The long-run goals of the United States, he said, would have been damaged by a cynical disregard for law.

Mr. Chayes asserted that the quarantine was sustainable under established principles of international law. He relied primarily, as Governments officials have in comments since the episode, on the authorization of the O.A.S.

However, Mr. Chayes, like Mr. Acheson, declared that it was foolish to ask such questions as, "Was the quarantine legal?" He said the first year of law school was supposed to teach lawyers not to ask generalized questions like that.

In domestic law, Mr. Chayes said, the whole effect of the judicial system is to refine and focus questions and get away from such abstractions. Since international law has no effective judicial remedies in most cases, he continued, it is up to international lawyers to do the refining and focusing--not "to deal at large with such deep policy questions."

Professor Wright accepted Mr. Chayes' contention that the vote of the Organization of American States authorized action against Cuba herself, since Cuba was a signatory to the O.A.S. treaty. But he said it was not a basis for action against ships of a third party, the Soviet Union.

Mr. Chayes contended that this approach produced the absurd result that it would be "illegal" to block Soviet ships en route to Cuba but "legal" to bomb anything in Cuba, or her territorial waters, including Soviet ships.

Komer, 27 March 64

On communication between Allies:

On Cyprus, our interests were not identical with British. But we had a good plan; which was held up for 10(?) days because we had failed to communicate with British, "educate" them (to a degree that was possible despite some difference in interest). Simply didn't get around to it? (British wouldn't accept, or had plan of their own?)

14 May

Hils: F-S exchange essential to interpretation of 26 May letter. The two were probably sent as a package ((K might guess: more likely to get answer to F offer earlier; and more likely to get good answer to letter if read in light of F offer.))

F was resident. (sure?)

Rusk told S to call F Saturday afternoon, wrote out message. S saw F at 1630, berated him in violent terms for Saturday morning message negating Friday night offer; said we never, never would consider Turkey deal in the slightest; said letter "means war." Said he spoke for himself, but hinted he reflected mood of nigherups.

(F claimed at start, and later, that K had not had F message at time he wrote Saturday morning letter.)

S had dinner with F Sunday night; F said he had been instructed to tell S that his services were much appreciated, and had been very valuable. In particular, that applied to his "explosion" Saturday afternoon.

Hils feels: Rusk took S channel very seriously at time, spent much time and attention with it; definitely influenced interpretation, and was basis for Trollope ploy. (Says Excomm was jubilant at 1000 Saturday morning, till new letter came in). F offer was only offer of inspection ((till Saturday morning letter?)), and F-S exchange Saturday afternoon the only brutal, explosive exchange known to Hils to convey mood to K.

Hughes checked out Keating claim of Oct 10, at the time, that there six IRBM sites; int comm had no basis for this; no refugee reports mentioned six, or total number; there were two good reports about Oct 18--could have been around earlier--but they referred to storage sites at Remedios. Hils thinks Keating got this out of the air.

(But consider position it put administration in, with their flat statements on "I know there is no evidence on missiles...I think it extremely unlikely they would put missiles in.")

14 May

Did K have reason to imagine that JFK might hold information tight till after election, or longer?

Sonn: crate evidence was available (to?) prior to Sept 19 estimate but was not distributed to estimators; Air Force analysts were convinced it was Il-28's. Item got in Bull one day toward end of September, but was withdrawn and order went out there were to be no further items included and no further speculations published on subject. Not mentioned publicly till Oct 22. He believed at time Admin. meant to withhold it till after election. K may have believed we knew it, drew same inference.

(Note: Bowles-Dobrynin conversation later, Oct 13; how did Bowles interpret this? What was plan? Why did we not confront, ask? Was there a "crisis" at news?)

Moreover, Sonn believed and believes that K thought we knew by Sept 13 at least--planes were flying, scratches were to be seen (by Sept 5? was that flight over right area--no--or did K know exactly what it might have seen? Or might he have thought we would have agent reports?) and took Sept 13 statement as evidence that JFK did not mean to announce or react.

But how could JFK fail--and how could K think he would fail--to release news or react, after statements of 4 and 13 Sept?

Sonn did believe, and belief was general, in week of discovery, that K intended to announce missiles in connection with Berlin, when they were ready, maybe the day after the election; K's statements connecting Berlin with after election did sink home, Thompson thesis that missiles were connected with Berlin was accepted, hence timing; moreover, pace suggested this. (It was not immediately clear when they would be operational. Also, it was not clear that any were operational then; it seemed likely that K would regard deterrence as better, against invasion or attack, when all were operational, and "one might go off.")

Sonn doesn't think ExComm did consider withholding news (note now many ~~xxx~~ knew by Oct 15; did this many, outside of int analysts, know of Il-28's?). But they were concerned about one possibly going off, perhaps captured or controlled by Cubans! Couldn't sit still with that possibility!

McN said (Sonn, Hil) from Tuesday to Thursday: in purely military strategic terms, no problem, just extra targets, makes no difference; no crisis (this was interpreted by I&R as arguing for inaction; but was this McN's recommendation, or was he merely abstracting from political considerations to give comment on wartime implications?)

Weiss: in my thesis, don't emphasize election so much in Cuban case as factor that K thought would make JFK so reluctant to announce to public; election may have been tactical consideration, adding insurance, but W. thinks main consideration would have been record of previous two years, leading K to think that JFK would accept move; hence, K would have been about as willing to do it in spring, or after election. (?) Berlin 1961 would be exception in pattern (though, Berlin Wall). ((But, maybe that taught K that the overt challenge was mistake, would force JFK's hand; what would get him to "cooperate" would be fait accompli, in public's eyes; public must not have proof too early, JFK must not be forced to give proof too early and ~~xxx~~ public must not have proof later that JFK knew earlier. (photos

Bud Southard, CIA

Questions for S and M:

1. How did the authors' own guesses or preconceptions change in the course of their study? What new patterns emerged in the course of it? What hypotheses were disconfirmed?
2. What, divergent, or invalid, beliefs were found to be held by other students, and by participants? What "wrong lessons" may have been learned?
3. What conclusions are sensitive to information not available then to participants, or to some important participants? To public?
4. What sorts of data did not authors not have adequate access to? What sorts couldn't they refer to?
5. What questions are left hanging? What major uncertainties remain?
6. What impressions were acquired as to patterns of dispute, inference or behavior that have also arisen in other crises?
7. What agency differences emerged in interpretation, prediction, policy, management: prior to and during crisis?
8. How well do staff and agency inputs to ExComm reflect the actual preoccupations, goals, predictions of members?
9. What did individual ExComm members fear, if they did nothing?

Source/evidence for:

- 1) ~~January~~ that K intended to ~~xxx~~ improve strategic balance.

Any chance that actual changes in balance of spring '62 seemed to make venture safer (than in fall '61, for example)?

4. How would missile deployment have "strengthened K's bargaining position" over Germany? What circumstances were critical to this; what would have affected result?
e.g., was it important to present US with surprise? How would disclosure have been made? Was it important to surprise U.S. Allies?
Would K have expected JFK to commit himself in Sept? ~~xxx~~ Might K have avoided this...by reducing secrecy, by private disclosure, public disclosure?
What alternative modes of ~~xxxxx~~ procedure were open to K, and why were they probably rejected (if considered)?

4. Given various advantages of successfully installing missiles in Cuba: were these given adequate weight in earlier estimates that they would not install? What do authors conclude about estimating process, preconceptions?

To what extent did it serve SU purposes to put missiles in Cuba, vs. other locations within MRBM range? Did they take into account the peculiar disadvantages, in terms of U.S. readiness to respond, sensitivity?

Did US commitments actually serve as incentive to install, to show up US bluff and demoralize Allies?

5. Given incentives to install, and given reasons for disbelieving JFK commitments: what could JFK have said, and what could US have done, to convince K that deployment was unprofitable? Prior to 1962; prior to Aug-8 1962; between July-Sept 1962?

~~Khrushchev~~ Khrushchev

Thomp: The mere fact that K asserted he could achieve his seven year plan without disarmament convinces me that the opposite is the case...

K told me SU had suffered from drought in some areas ~~but~~ and excess rain in others but that crop would be about best they had ever had. In my opinion this almost certainly untrue and knowing K believe if this were fact he would have emphasized it much more strongly.

The U-2 and the Cuban Crisis

collateral

1. Negative evidence on ~~agent~~ reports (spring 1962).
 2. Negative on ~~intelligence~~ missile reports, 5 Aug. (and on buildup?)
 3. Positive on SAMs, negative on MRBMs, 29 Aug and 4 Sept.
 4. Alleged: McN, JFK relied heavily on photos, little on reports ("not evidence").
 5. 30 Aug ~~xxx~~; U-2 overflight of Sakhalin; Sept 8, U-2 shot down over China; 2 31 Aug, 7 Sept evidence of SAMs, no evidence of MRBMs---planned flight Sept 10 cancelled (why?): meeting of Sept 10.
- a) sensitivity to incidents; b) little prob of MRBMs: 1) no evidence (assumption that they couldn't appear soon?), plus evidence of SAMs with which to discount agent reports; 3) expert disbelief (ONE, except for McC); 4) political disbelief (especially, wishfully, after we had announced?)
c) appearance of SAMs (especially in area where reports indicated possible site).

This led to desire